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Abstract
This paper addresses the assessment of efficiency of production units in cases
where some characteristics of the production process are known. In particular
we focus on the existence of direct linkages between inputs and outputs, where
certain outputs are produced from specific inputs and not jointly produced from all
inputs. Our aim is to use and empirically compare alternative forms of reflecting
the linkages between inputs and outputs. The alternatives to be compared to reflect
the linkages between inputs and outputs are: the use of separate assessments; the
use of ratios between linked outputs and inputs; and the use of differences between
linked outputs and inputs. These alternatives are presented and contextualised
within existing procedures for dealing with output-specific inputs, and results are
discussed and illustrated empirically in the context of evaluating courts’ efficiency.
Subject Classifications: Economics: Efficiency measurement, output-specific
inputs; Government: services - courts
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1 Introduction
Efficiency measurement through frontier methods (such as Data Envelopment Analy-
sis, DEA) assume that all inputs are jointly used in the production of all outputs. In real
situations, however, this may not be the case since certain inputs may be associated to the
production of a single output or to a subset of the outputs. One of the earliest examples
in the literature considering the link between specific inputs and specific outputs is that of
Thanassoulis et al. (1995), where the authors wanted to consider the output ‘survival rate
of babies at risk’, which was a ratio, while all other variables in the model were volume
measures. Therefore the authors used the denominator (babies at risk) on the input side
and the numerator (number of babies at risk surviving) on the output side. Given that
these two variables were intrinsically linked, the authors introduced weight restrictions in
the model linking the weights of these input and output variables. In education contexts,
when value added of students is computed, it is usual to consider attainment on entry on
the input side and attainment on exit of a certain educational stage on the output side
(see e.g. Portela and Camanho, 2010; Portela et al., 2012). In this circumstance, if on exit
we consider two subjects (e.g. reading and mathematics) and on entry the same subjects
are considered, it is clear that previous attainment in reading is mostly responsible for
the output attainment on exit in reading and the previous attainment in maths is mostly
responsible by the attainment on exit in mathematics. Another situation, depicted in the
empirical application of this paper, is that of courts’ efficiency where cases handled by
the court depend on the cases that were assigned to that court. As a result, outputs can
be defined as the cases of various types that were resolved within a period of analysis,
and inputs can be, among others, the number of cases that entered the court in the same
period of analysis. If we specify the type of cases (e.g. family cases) it is clear that the
output number of family cases resolved is mainly linked to the input number of family
cases entered, and not with the remaining workload of the court.
Other examples can be found in Salerian and Chan (2005), who analysed a railway
application where the input ‘number of passenger cars’ and the output ‘net tonnes of
freight’ were not related, and the input ‘number of freight wagons’ was not related to the
output ‘passenger kilometres’. All other inputs considered (number of employees, track
kilometres and number of locomotives) were shared in the production of the two outputs.
Recently Cherchye et al. (2013) proposed a method for handling this type of links between
2
inputs and outputs and applied it to electric utilities taking into account the fact that
the input ‘fuel consumption’ does not influence the output ‘non-fossil energy generated’,
but has an impact in the remaining outputs (see also Cherchye et al. (2015b) ).
We will use in this paper the same terminology as that used in Cherchye et al. (2013),
where ‘Joint inputs’ are the inputs related to the production of all outputs (the usual
inputs in efficiency assessments); ‘Output-specific inputs’ are those inputs that only con-
tribute to the production of a specific output, and ‘Sub-joint inputs’ are those inputs
that contribute to the production of a subset of outputs, but not all of them. In this
paper we address only output-specific inputs and will not address sub-joint inputs. In
particular, we explore various possibilities to reflect the linkage between inputs and out-
puts. We term the alternative approaches: the separation, the ratio and the difference
approaches. The separation approach is related to recent work by Cherchye et al. (2013)
and is also inspired in the work of Tsai and Molinero (2002). The ratio approach is linked
to previous attempts by Salerian and Chan (2005) and Despic et al. (2007), but the final
model used is an adaptation of Olesen et al. (2015) to handle ratio data in DEA. The
difference approach is, to our knowledge, new in the literature, but we show that it is
equivalent to the use of a specific type of weight restrictions in DEA models. The various
approaches are exposed and compared by means of an empirical application to courts
efficiency in Portugal (to the authors knowledge, there is only one published study on
courts’ efficiency in this country).
Promoting courts’ efficiency is part of the European Commission concerns, which
has resulted in the creation of ‘The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice’
(CEPEJ) in September 2002 with Resolution Res(2002)12. CEPEJ undertakes regular
processes for evaluating judicial systems (in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and quality)
of the Council of Europe’s member states. In a recent survey regarding the determinants
of judicial efficiency Voigt (2014) distinguishes two sources of judicial efficiency: Those
related with the supply side of justice (e.g. quality of the law, judicial organization,
judges’ individual incentives , etc.) and those related with the demand side of justice (in-
fluenced by the regulation of lawyers, court’ costs incurred by judicial parties, propensity
to litigate, court delay, etc.). Due to the lack of other types of data, courts’ performance
is mainly measured by indicators such as: cases resolved per judge, clearance rates (per-
centage of filed cases that are resolved), pending cases, etc. Differences between courts
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on the ‘operational’ performance described through variables like the above, can be ex-
plained by several factors like the stability and dimension of courts’ staff, the quality of
the judges’ decisions, and the complexity of the cases handled. In this paper we will be
concerned just with operational performance and will not attempt to explain differences
in performance between courts, nor enter into account with quality variables (due to the
difficulty in obtaining such data). As a result the application to courts should be re-
garded as illustrative of the methods proposed to link inputs and outputs, rather than as
a thorough attempt to evaluate courts in Portugal. We note however, that due to recent
reforms in the organization of courts in Portugal such exhaustive analysis is a necessity.
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. It puts forth several methods
to link inputs and outputs, adapting some existing models in the literature and proposing
some others for the first time: It also empirically compares and highlitghs the advantages
and disadvantages of each alternative.
2 Previous Literature on Courts’ efficiency
There are not many empirical applications on the analysis of courts’ efficiency through
frontier methods worldwide, and only one in Portugal - reported in Santos and Amado
(2014). Santos and Amado (2014) reviewed the literature on courts efficiency and found
just 24 studies applying the non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique
to this context. The level of analysis can be varied, from the micro level of the court (or
even the benches, as in this paper) to judicial districts (e.g. in Lewin et al. (1982) and
Gorman and Ruggiero (2009)), regions or even countries (e.g. Deyneli, 2011). The first
reported study on judicial performance is that of Lewin et al. (1982) who evaluated the
efficiency of 30 judicial districts in the North Carolina US state. Districts were compared
based on 5 inputs (size of caseload, court’s working days, number of attorneys and other
workers, number of misdemeanors in the caseload, and size of white population) and 2
outputs (total number of dispositions and the number cases pending with less than 90
days).
The number of personnel at the court (aggregated or disaggregated in judges, assis-
tants and other personnel) has been used in most efficiency applications to courts. The
second most used input regards caseload, which in most cases includes pending cases and
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new cases, but sometimes the two are considered disaggregated. Regarding outputs it is
clear that one output dominates the courts’ efficiency literature: The number of finished
or resolved cases. This output appears in various forms, sometimes aggregated into a
single figure, while other times disaggregated over different types of cases (e.g. Kittelsen
(1992) used 7 types of decisions as outputs, and Santos and Amado (2014) used 43 types
of cases).
Rarely quality variables have been included in the analysis. In spite of that, some
attempts have been made to explain the efficiency of courts through contextual variables
(more common on macro studies and including variable like GDP per capita, percentage
of population belonging to ethnic minorities, and percentage of population with higher
education (Gorman and Ruggiero, 2009), or judges’ salaries, academic degree, and number
of courts (Deyneli, 2011) ), or judges’ related variables (e.g. academic qualifications of
judges, and their career perspectives (Schneider, 2005). A quality variable has been used
recently in Falavigna et al. (2015) and related to court delay (measured as an undesirable
output in an directional distance function model through the variable ‘number of days
required to finish a process’. Note that quality variables like those advocated within
judicial literature (see e.g. Posner (2000)), as the number of citations of the decision
from other courts (applicable only to Anglo-Saxonic law), the number of times that the
direction of the sentence is reversed by superior instances, or the distinction between the
cases that finish with complete appreciation of the case have been rarely used within the
efficiency literature. Exceptions can be found in Pedraja-Chaparro and Salinas-Jimenez
(1996) and Gorman and Ruggiero (2009) who distinguish between jury trial cases and
non-trial cases (those that are finished without a complete process because a settlement
was reached, withdrawal, etc.).
In Portugal, DEA is applied for the first time to courts by Santos and Amado (2014).
The authors assessed 213 first instance courts from 2007 to 2011, excluding the admin-
istrative courts. They used a single input (staff: divided into judges and administrative
workers) and did not consider caseload as an input variable. As outputs, Santos and
Amado (2014) used the total of finished cases of 43 types. In order to increase the discrim-
ination of the model, weight restrictions were imposed in accordance with the complexity
of cases (proxied by duration). They concluded that only 16% of courts were efficient
and that inefficiency is higher in small courts (with less than 500 cases). Efficiency is also
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higher for courts with a higher percentage of workers per judge.
3 Courts Input and Output Data
The Portuguese judicial system suffered recently (in 2014) a re-estructuration. The
data used in this study (from 2010 to 2012) is prior to that re-estructuration. Before
2014 courts could be classified into various types: judicial courts, administrative and
fiscal courts, the constitutional court, accounting court, military courts, and justice of
peace courts (used to solve very small conflicts). The sample analysed in our empirical
application corresponds to judicial courts, which develop their activity in the whole na-
tional territory divided in ‘comarcas’ for the effect, which differ from the administrative
distribution of the counties in Portugal (concelhos). Judicial courts divide in 3 instances:
the 1st instance, which is the first level of decision, the 2nd instance, or Appeal courts,
which is composed of relation courts and 3rd instance which corresponds to the Supreme
Court of justice (which is the superior hierarchical body of the judicial courts). First
instance judicial courts are organized within judicial districts, organized in circles, which
are organized in judicial counties (comarcas), organized in smaller units - benches (consti-
tuted mainly by a single judge and some administrative staff). Courts or Benches can be
generic (addressing a large variety of cases), specific (addressing only certain processual
forms) and specialized (where judges specialize in certain branches of law, like family,
work, etc). Figure 1 illustrates how first instance courts are subdivided.
The 2014 reform (see Law 62/2013 regulated by Decree law, 49/2014) had two main
purposes:, to implement specialized jurisdictions at the national level and to implement
a new model of management of judicial counties. As a result of the reform, most generic
courts and benches disappeared and work was centralized on specialized courts. Our
analysis focus on generic competence benches (the most disaggregate unit of analysis).
On the contrary Santos and Amado (2014) focused their analysis on the efficiency of
judicial counties (Comarcas), analysing 223 of these during the period of 2007 to 2011.
These judicial counties include generic competence and specialized courts that are not
necessarily comparable.
Our sample comprises 267 benches of generic competence. Most of these benches are
































Figure 1: Structure of Portuguese Judicial System
rable. We used data from 2010 to 2012 but these data were averaged and a single period
analysis was performed (similarly to Schneider (2005)). The reasons for this averaging
process relies on the picks of cases that some benches may have in some years due to
mega-cases that consume most of the resources of a bench. Following the literature we
chose as inputs the number of administrative workers (judges were not considered as most
benches have a single judge), and average number of cases entered. Pending cases were
not considered as they were not available. As a result, the input set does not reflect the
entire workload of the court but it reflects the demand for courts’ services in a given pe-
riod, and the ability of the court to satisfy that demand. The comparison between supply
(cases resolved) and demand (incoming cases) leads to what is usually knows as clearance
rate. Only when clearance rates are higher than 100% courts are able to catch up with
backlog cases. Outputs considered in the assessments undertook are the average number
of cases resolved in the period under analysis. In order to reflect the mix of caseload of
benches, cases were partitioned into 6 categories, from an initial number of 27 types of
cases identified as part of the work of the benches (see e.g. Kittelsen (1992) who used a
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similar approach). The construction of the 6 categories took into account the similarity
of competences required to solve the cases, such that each category was constituted by
cases that followed a similar process. The final 6 categories are the following: 1- Common
cases, provisional orders , embargoes and divorces (Common) 2 - Special cases, inven-
tories,credit claims and workplace accidents (Special); 3- Civil enforcement and service
judicial notice (Enforcement) 4- Corporate reorganization/bankruptcy (Bankruptcy) 5 -
Guardianship cases (Guardianship); 6- Other cases(Other)
For each of these six categories the number of cases entered was considered an input.
In addition to these 6 inputs we also considered the input ’number of administrative
workers’ in the court. The number of judges was not included in the input set as benches
are divisions of a court represented by a single judge. As a result our court assessment
in fact compares the performance of judges in handling the cases that were assigned to
them.
This set of inputs and outputs raised the question that is addressed in this paper:
What possible ways can be used to reflect the intrinsic link that exists between each
input and each output? That is, the number of cases regarding e.g. civil enforcement
that were resolved by the court is mainly linked with the number of cases of this type that
the court received and not (directly) with the other types of incoming cases. Indirectly
there could be a link, but this link is reflected in the global case load and case mix of
the court (Some courts may receive more process of a certain type and therefore devoting
less time to processes of the other types). The next section will describe the models put
forth to resolve the problem of the intrinsic links between the inputs and the outputs in
our courts example. Note however, that this problem is likely to appear in other settings
too as discussed in the introduction.
Descriptive statistics for the input/output variables in, Table 1, show that on average
the number of cases of various types entering the courts (-E) are higher than the number
of cases resolved (-F), meaning that indeed backlog is accumulating in Portuguese general
competence courts. Average clearance rates (CR), also shown, are generally very close
to 100% or even below it, except in the case of bankruptcy cases where clearance rates
(CR) are on average above 1 (1.14). Note however, that this type of cases are the ones
with a lower value in Table 1 meaning that only a small percentage of the workload of a
court is composed of these cases.
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Average St DEv Max Min Av. CR Max CR Min CR
Workers 6.84 2.55 12.3 1
Common-E 213.92 103.51 467.33 28
Special-E 91.99 55.09 264 0
Enforcement-E 340.20 194.07 1217.33 33.33
Bankruptcy-E 9.13 11.20 44.33 0
Guardianship-E 20.15 17.91 98.33 0
Others-E 27.34 23.16 103.67 0
Common-F 223.22 108.83 593 27 1.05 1.37 0.8
Special-F 87.40 50.09 237 0 0.98 2.43 0.48
Enforcement-F 236.74 128.91 672 14 0.72 2.58 0.17
Bankruptcy-F 9.11 10.58 44.33 0 1.14 6 0.21
Guardianship-F 20.25 17.54 85.67 0 1.05 2 0.50
Others-F 23.47 20.53 117 0 1.01 5.36 0.21
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
4 Output specific inputs - Alternative approaches
An output oriented directional distance function (see e.g. Chung et al. (1997)) under
constant returns to scale (benches analysed are single judged and therefore comparable
in size) will be used as a basis for efficiency computations. Generically we consider
a production technology with n DMUs, consuming m inputs (xij, i = 1, ...,m) and
producing s outputs (yrj, r = 1, ..., s). The directional vector (gyr , gxi) specifies the
direction for improvement, but in our case we set gxi to zero. The directional distance







λjyrj ≥ yro + βgyr , r = 1, . . . , s, (1)
n∑
j=1
λjxij ≤ xio, i = 1, . . . ,m, λj ≥ 0 ∀j
}

















vixij ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n,
s∑
r=1
urgyr = 1, ur, vi ≥ 0 ∀r, ∀i
}
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Three approaches are going to be compared as a way of dealing with the output specific
inputs in our courts example. The first approach will be called ‘Separation’ approach
and corresponds to the analysis of the production process of each output separately and
independently from the others. The second approach will be called the ‘Ratio’ approach
and will replace outputs by clearance rates (the ratio between the cases resolved and
the cases entered) for each type of case. The third approach will be called ‘Difference’
approach and will replace outputs by the difference between cases resolved and cases
entered. Such a difference actually corresponds to the variation in the pending cases
(i.e. when difference is positive pending cases reduced, when difference is negative the
pending cases increased by the amount of the difference). In the next sections each of
the approaches will be detailed and results obtained for each will be shown. Note that
a distinctive feature between the three approaches lies on the assumptions regarding
the production technology. The separation approach assumes that the production of
each output can be modeled through an individual production process, while the other
approaches assume that there is a single production process for the production of all
outputs, and linkages between inputs and outputs are modeled through manipulation of
the variables rather than changing the production possibility set.
Models (1) and (2), were the base model in all the approaches. A directional vector
equal to unity was chosen in all cases. Such a vector implies that the resulting inefficiency
scores are units dependent and not comparable across approaches given the different
units of measurement of the variables. In order to compare the approaches we used
the above models as a means to determine efficient output targets in terms of cases
finished of each type r (CF ∗r ). After that a measure of efficiency was constructed for each
output as CFr/CF
∗
r , where CFr stands for observed cases finished or resolved. After
obtaining these measures of output efficiency, they can be aggregated to generate an
overall efficiency score. The way this aggregation is performed is not without implications.
In the spirit of models 1 and 2, the maximum value obtained for each output should be





, r = 1, ...,m, meaning that the optimal value of β will be equal
to the minimum ratio between target output and observed output, which is the same
as to say that β equals the maximum ratio between the observed and target output).
However, this maximum can hide important discrepancies between output efficiencies.
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Averages could be used to resolve this problem and provide balanced overall efficiency
scores. The average, cannot however, be used as it suffers from ‘aggregation inconsistency’
(see e.g Färe and Karagiannis., 2014). In order to assure aggregation consistency in the
final efficiency score computed we used a weighted average of the individual efficiency





r ). When this aggregation weight is used, the resulting overall aggregate









The separation approach assumes separable production functions for each output as
first introduced in Banker (1992). A complete separation model would imply that the
specific links between inputs and outputs are dealt with by computing the efficiency of
output production in 6 distinctive models, one for each output. Clearly a single model can
be solved for assessing the production of each output r, by considering different intensity
variables for each output production process λrj . The resulting model is shown in (3),
where xij is now replaced by xrj, since for each output r there is a corresponding input









λrjyrj ≥ yro + βrgyr , r = 1, . . . , s, (3)
n∑
j=1
λrjxrj ≤ xro, r = 1, . . . , s, (4)
n∑
j=1
λrjWj ≤ Wo, r = 1, . . . , s λj ≥ 0
}
This model is similar to that proposed by Cherchye et al. (2013) called also the
decentralized efficiency score in Cherchye et al. (2015a), but we consider that the convexity
assumption holds for outputs. Note that we also considered an expansion factor βr
associated to each output to allow for as little dependence across the six categories of
outputs as possible, and also because of technological sets having zero cases entered and
zero cases finished, which created problems when a single expansion factor for outputs
was adopted. The above model, replicates for each output production possibilities set the
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constraint regarding the joint input. We modify the above model to take into account
the fact that the workers are shared among the output production processes, and as
a result a single constraint for workers could be used to replace the last constraint,











jα6Wj ≤ Wo. This constraint is in the spirit
of Tsai and Molinero (2002), where a single constraint was used to model joint inputs
in teaching and research in an university example, as pioneered by Beasley (1995) in a
assessment of university departments. Note that similar models have been proposed by
Cook and Hababou (2001) in the context of assessing service and sales performance in
bank branches, where some inputs and outputs were specific to each of these functions but
some inputs were shared by both. Both Tsai and Molinero (2002) and Beasley (1995) have
let the model determine the optimal shares of joint resource allocated to each process.
In our case, there is no observed allocation of the joint input over each output, and as a
result leaving the model to ’choose’ this allocation, when there is no observed allocation
seemed a rather arbitrary procedure. We therefore set αr equal to (
1
m
). Note that the
objective of using this share is to turn the scale of the left hand side and right hand
side comparable. An alternative approach would be to multiply Wo on the right hand
side by 6, since on the left hand side this variable is being considered 6 times - one for
each process specific technology. As a result, any other definition of the share would be
arbitrary (and in fact would not work as several attempts revealed).









λrjyrj ≥ yro + βrgyr , r = 1, . . . , s, (5)
n∑
j=1





λrjαrWj ≤ Wo, λj ≥ 0
}
Applying model (5) to the Courts data, with a unitary directional vector, resulted in
the outputs efficiency scores shown in Table 2.
Common Special Enforcement Bankruptcy Guardianship Others
Score 78.12% 69.48% 28.54% 90.31% 86.14% 42.97%
N. Eff 9 12 1 130 56 25
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Table 2: Results for each output efficiency using separation approach
The output showing the highest efficiency is bankruptcy cases, meaning that courts
in general resolve a high number of these cases given the resources available and the cases
received (note that in absolute terms this is the lowest volume input - see Table 1 - and
the one with the highest clearance rate). The output with least efficiency is ‘enforcement
cases’, where courts resolve on average a low number of such cases given the workforce
and the number of cases of this type the court received (in absolute terms this is the type
of cases with higher volume and lower clearance rates). In terms of aggregate efficiency
the mean for the total sample of courts is 44.33%. No court is considered 100% efficient,
meaning that none showed maximum efficiency in the production of all outputs.
4.2 Ratio Approach
The second approach that we consider for dealing with output-specific inputs is based
on the fact that the ratios between the outputs and the output-specific inputs entail
a meaning: clearance rates, used commonly as a KPI in assessing the performance of
courts. Courts with a clearance rate above 1 are clearing pending cases, as they resolve
more cases than the ones that entered the court. On the contrary clearance rates below
1 mean that pending cases are accumulating. The use of ratios to reflect direct linkages
between volume inputs and outputs can be seen as the opposite approach to that taken in
Thanassoulis et al. (1995), where ratios were replaced by volume measures. The replace-
ment of volume measures by ratios has been suggested before, although not necessarily
with the purpose addressed in this paper. For example, Despic et al. (2007) propose solv-
ing DEA models through a replacement of all variables in the model by all possible ratios
between outputs and inputs. Ratios are considered then the outputs of a DEA model
with a single unitary input. Results from this modified model and the traditional DEA
model are not coincident, but are somehow related, as shown by Despic et al. (2007).
Clearly, only the ratios that correspond to links of interest between inputs and outputs
may be considered under this approach, and as a result the linkages can be reflected in
the chosen ratios. In our case we did not follow this approach given the existence of the
joint input relating to number of workers. As we were interested in using the model to
determine targets we would face a problem as we would have for each output (e.g. num-
ber of common cases solved) two targets: One for the ratio between ‘N. Common cases
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resolved’/‘Workers’ and another for the ratio ‘N. Common cases resolved’/‘N. Common
cases entered’. As a result, we decided to keep on the input side the number of workers
and using the clearance rates on the output side. This raised another problem. That
of mixing a volume measure with ratio data, which by definition are adimensional. The
implications of permitting this mix of variable types would be that smaller courts, with
a low number of workers, but reasonable clearance rates would become efficient. Under
a CRS model this would imply unachievable and unrealistic targets for most units.
The problems arising from mixing ratio data with volume measures are relatively
well known and have been addressed before (e.g. Hollingsworth and Smith (2003) or
Emrouznejad and Amin (2009)). There are two known problems related to DEA models
applied to ratio data: (1) the violation of the proportionality implicit in constant returns
to scale (this violation is not a problem under variable returns to scale), and (2) the
convexity problem analysed in Emrouznejad and Amin (2009), where convex targets
formed from ratios may lie on the interior or outside of the production possibility set
formed by volume measures. This happens because a convex combination of ratios is
not equivalent to the ratio between the convex combination of the respective numerators
and denominators. Recently Olesen et al. (2015) addressed extensively the issue of ratio
and volume variables in DEA models and proposed models that can address the above
problems. An interesting remark made by the authors is that not all ratios are the
same. As a result, ratios are classified into: proportional ratios (those that increase
proportionality with the increase in volume measures), fixed ratios (those that do not
vary when volume measures change), downward proportional ratios (are proportional
when volume measures decrease but fixed when they increase), and upward proportional
ratios (are proportional when volume measures increase, but fixed when volume measures
decrease). Our ratio measures (clearance rates) may be considered fixed ratios. That is,
when the number of workers increases it is expected that the number of cases entered and
number of cases resolved also increase by a similar proportion. However, as a single judge
is dealing with the cases very large increases in the number of workers will not translate
in proportional increases in cases.
Considering the ratios in our illustrative example fixed, the proportionality and con-
vexity problems are solved adapting the linear model proposed by Olesen et al. (2015)
where the volume input responds to scale and the ratio outputs are fixed. This model
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with only fixed ratios (Rrj) and a single input measure (Wj) is shown in (7) adapted to








λj(Rrj − (Rro + βgRr)) ≥ 0, r = 1, . . . , s, j = 1, ..., n
n∑
j=1
λj = 1, λj ≥ 0 ∀j
}
(7)
The first constraint allows for proportionality on the volume input through αj, whereas
λj is restricted to sum 1. The second set of constraints assure that only when the ratio
r of the peer unit j is greater than the ratio for the observed unit (Rro), the intensity
variable for peer j (λj) can be greater than zero. Model (7) is not, however, interesting
as αj equal to zero always satisfies the first constraint. The first solution to solve this
problem is to ignore the scaling of inputs and treat the model as VRS. This would result
in fact in a FDH model as shown in Podinovski (2005). The second solution would be
to add volume outputs (yrj) to the above model and allow the scaling of inputs by α
and the scaling of volume outputs by the same proportion. This second alternative was
adopted given the knowledge we have about the numerators and denominators of the
ratio measures, and is shown in model (8) (the first alternative should be preferred if this







λjαjWj ≤ Wo, (8)
(Rro + βgRr)−Rrj ≤M(1− kj), r = 1, . . . , s, j = 1, ..., n, λj ≤ kj, j = 1, ...n
n∑
j=1
λjαjyrj ≥ yro, r = 1, . . . , s
n∑
j=1
λj = 1, λj ≥ 0, kj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j
}
Solving model (8) involved replacing the product αjλj by a new variable, such that
the non-linearity of the constraints was removed. Note that given the knowledge about
the numerator and denominator the approach of Emrouznejad and Amin (2009) could be




≥ Rro + βgRr . This approach
was not followed in order to allow for its flexibility when dealing with cases where only
ratios are known.
Targets from model (8) are obtained directly form the ratio targets: R∗rj, which can
be converted to the target finished cases that the court in question should attain (CF ∗rj =
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R∗rj× cases type r entered), when it is compared to other courts with higher clearance
rates and simultaneously lower number of workers.
Results from applying the ratio model (8) to our sample of courts revealed an average
aggregate efficiency of 90.11% with 155 courts appearing with 100% efficiency. In terms
of average output efficiencies these are displayed in Table 3 together with the number of
courts showing 100% efficiency in the production of each output.
Common Special Enforcement Bankrupcy Guardianship Others
Score 93.87% 92.15% 87.25% 90.12% 93.23% 86.19%
N. Eff 155 155 155 122 129 148
Table 3: Results for each output efficiency using ratio approach
Common cases are those where courts reveal higher efficiency, this is followed by
guardianship and special cases. The output whose production is less efficient is the other
cases.
4.3 Difference Approach
The third and last approach that we consider for dealing with output-specific inputs is
based on the fact that the differences between the outputs and the input-specific outputs
entail a meaning related to pending cases: pending cases at the end of a particular period
are equal to: pending cases at the beginning of the period, plus incoming cases of the
period minus cases resolved during the period. As a result the difference between resolved
cases and new cases entered (our outputs and inputs) yields the variation in pending cases
(i.e. initial number of pending cases minus the pending cases in the end of the period).
A positive value in the difference means that there was an effective reduction in pending
cases as the pending cases in the end of the period are lower to those at the beginning.
When the difference is negative, it means that pending cases built up.
Taking differences between outputs and output-specific inputs is equivalent to the
consideration of weight restrictions where one imposes the weights on inputs and corre-
sponding outputs to be the same. Weight restrictions that link inputs and outputs are
called ARII constraints (see Thompson et al. (1990, 1992)). Note that the weights deter-
mined in a DEA model are units dependent meaning that the equality between weights
can be done directly when the unit of measurement is the same, or should take the units
of measurement into account when that is not the case.
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Model (1) added of these weight restrictions (WR), is shown in (9), for our specific
setting of 6 inputs (x1, ..., x6) linked to the production of 6 outputs (y1, ..., y6), and one

















vi xij + v Wj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n,
6∑
r=1
ur gyr = 1, u1 = v1, u2 = v2, u3 = v3, u4 = v4, u5 = v5, u6 = v6,u ≥ 0,v ≥ 0
}











wr(yrj − xrj) + vWj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , n,
6∑
r=1
wr gyr = 1, w ≥ 0
}







λj (yrj − xrj) ≥ (yro − xro) + βgyr , r = 1, ..., 6 (11)
n∑
j=1
λj Wj ≤ Wo, λj ≥ 0
}
The dual model in (11) has 6 output constraints and one input constraint - if no
joint inputs had been considered we would end up with a model with just outputs and
no inputs, that is infeasible (multiplier) or unbounded (envelopment). In the presence
of joint inputs this problem does not arise. In the absence of joint inputs one way to
solve the infeasibility problem would be to consider a unitary input. This, however would
change returns to scale assumptions.
Running model (11) or (10) using a unitary directional vector yields the results shown
in Table 4 for each output average efficiency. Overall 15 units have been identified as
100% efficient and the aggregate efficiency was 85.84%.
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Common Special Enforcement Bankrupcy Guardianship Others
Score 93.75% 87.69% 81.63% 64.07% 82.48% 70.98
N. Eff 15 15 15 11 14 14
Table 4: Results for each output efficiency using difference approach
Common cases are again those where courts reveal higher efficiency, this is followed
by special cases and then by guardianship. The output whose production is less efficient
is bankruptcy cases, (contrarily to the other approaches that identified bankruptcy cases
as the ones with higher efficiency), followed by other cases (consistently with the other
two approaches).
5 Comparing Approaches
Efficiency values obtained from the various approaches can be compared because they
have been computed based on target finish cases from each approach. Higher efficiency
values, mean therefore targets that are closer to observed values - less demanding.
The average efficiencies obtained from the 3 approaches in the production of the 6
outputs are shown in Table 5.
Approach Common Special Enforcement Bankruptcy Guardianship Others Overall Agg
Separation 78.12% 69.48% 28.54% 90.31% 86.14% 42.97% 44.33%
Ratio 93.87% 92.15% 87.25% 90.12% 93.23% 86.19% 90.11%
Difference 93.75% 87.69% 81.63% 64.07% 82.48% 70.98% 85.84%
Table 5: Results for each output efficiency and overall efficiency in three approaches
Higher efficiency scores mean targets that are closer to observed values and lower
efficiency scores mean more demanding targets. As a result, the ratio approach is the one
yielding closer targets to observed values in most cases. Aggregate overall efficiency is
also the highest for the ratio approach. Regarding the ranking of output efficiencies, the
ratio and separation approaches, consider that the cases where courts are most efficient
are Common cases. The 3 approaches show different outputs as the least efficient: under
the separation approach the least efficiency of courts is in dealing with enforcement cases,
other cases are identified as the least efficient by the ratio approach and bankruptcy are
identified by the differences approach.
The correlation between aggregate efficiencies is not very high. The correlation be-
tween the ratio and the difference approach is the lowest, 0.40, followed by the correlation
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between the separation and the ratio approach (0.46). The highest correlation is between
the separation and the difference (0.61). The correlation between ranks follows a similar
pattern and the magnitude of the coefficients is very similar, with the highest correlation
happening between the separation and difference approaches (close to 0.8). Computing
differences between the aggregate efficiencies of the various methods results in the values
shown in Table 6.
Difference− Difference− Ratio−
Separation Ratio Separation
Average 41.47% -4.27% 45.74%
N. positive diferences 265 98 267
N. negative differences 2 169 0
Table 6: Differences between scores of the 3 approaches
The above results show that the ratio approach has produced always higher or equal
(the zero is contained in the positive differences in Table 6) aggregate scores than the
separation approach. The difference approach in the majority of cases also has higher
efficiency scores than the separation approach, but in this case two benches are exceptions
to this rule. On average the separation approach is about 40 percentage points below
the ratio and the difference approaches in terms of aggregate efficiency. As a result the
difference and ratio approaches are the closest in terms of efficiency scores. Note however
that in terms of rank correlation the highest similarities are between the separation and
difference approaches.
Our aim in this paper is not to compare mathematically the 3 approaches, since
they use different assumptions and variables. However, the above results are intuitively
expected. The separation approach is clearly the one where lower efficiency scores are to
be obtained, due to the fact that each output is optimized in an output specific production
set. On the contrary, the ratio approach is the one where higher efficiency scores are
expected because by definition ratios do not verify the convexity assumption and as a
result a non-convex model (of the FDH type) is clearly less discriminating and results in
a higher number of frontier units. Note that one may be inclined to think that the higher
number of efficient units in this case is due to different returns to scale assumption used
in the ratio model and the remaining models. We attribute higher efficiency scores to the
non-convex assumptions on ratios, but not on returns to scale assumptions. Since ratios
are adimensional measures whose comparison and computation always ignores issues of
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scale, in the presence of ratio data, no other assumption for these variables can be invoked
than constant returns to scale.
A more detailed analysis was performed regarding the characteristics of the best and
worst performers under all approaches. For that purpose we divided the sample into
the top 25% performers (as the 67 units with highest efficiency) and the bottom 25%
performers (as the 67 units with lowest efficiency), and computed the average inputs and
outputs for each of these groups. Results are shown in Table 7.
Top 25% Bottom 25%
Separation Ratio Difference Separation Ratio Difference
Wkr 6.39 6.69 7.00 6.73 6.75 6.52
Common-E 228.01 225.26 212.77 192.05 195.06 216.70
Special-E 96.03 98.43 87.50 86.41 85.19 101.86
Enforcement-E 301.60 351.59 301.36 365.47 334.50 398.89
Bankruptcy-E 10.85 10.26 9.46 6.60 7.07 8.38
Guardianship-E 19.26 21.25 19.57 15.82 15.19 17.28
Other-E 31.60 29.94 29.19 19.43 22.38 25.74
Common-F 251.36 240.86 238.03 186.43 192.33 209.01
Special-F 97.97 95.90 89.82 75.64 75.25 89.64
Enforcement-F 257.38 253.29 260.13 203.91 201.59 215.19
Bankrupcy-F 11.24 10.55 10.08 6.53 6.60 7.99
guardianship-F 20.10 21.99 21.27 15.27 14.23 15.60
Other-F 30.85 27.19 28.40 14.82 16.11 20.33
Table 7: Characteristics of best and worst performers in the 3 approaches
In bold we signal the highest average values and we use under script to signal the
lowest. In spite of the different efficiency scores obtained under each approach, there
is consistency on the characteristics of the best and worst performing units under each
approach. This can be seen in Figure 2 where we use as a basis the top performers under
the separation approach and compare the average performance of the various groups in
relation to this one.
The graph on the left shows that best performers are similar between approaches,
with the ratio approach identifying top performers with slightly more inputs than the top
performers of the other approaches and similar or lower outputs (revealing that under
the ratio approach top performers appear on average the least efficient. The graph on the
right compares worst performers between approaches, where it is clear that the bottom
performers identified in the differences approach are on average dealing with more cases





















Figure 2: Characteristics of top performers and bottom performers under each approach
Comparing now best and worst performers within approaches (see Figure 3) we can
see that under the ratio and separation approaches best performers generally deal with
more cases than worst performers, they have in general more cases in and more cases
out. For the differences approach worst performers show particularly high enforcement
cases entering the court, and similar or higher number of cases for the remaining types
of processes, but they show lower cases finished than the best performers.
Analysing specifically the cases that showed the highest differences in ranking between
approaches we show in Table 8 the observed values of the volume measures, the clearance
ratios, and the differences between finished cases and entered cases for these units. We
also show the total average of the sample as a means of comparison.
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Figure 3: Characteristics of top performers and bottom performers within each approach
Eff Separation 0.3352 0.6769 0.3242 0.4361
Eff Ratio 1 1 1 0.7702
Eff Diff 0.7291 0.679 0.6303 0.9401
T24 T261 T68 T95 Average Sample
Wkr 8.5 2 4 6 6.84
Common-E 251.33 402.67 116 118.33 213.92
Special-E 105.67 184 52.33 64 91.99
Enforcement-E 536.67 644.67 283.67 172.67 340.20
Bankruptcy-E 2.67 19.33 4 9.12
Guardianship-E 43.67 33.17 17.33 20.15
Other-E 2 62.33 3.33 2.67 27.341
Common-F 213.33 394.67 102.67 133 223.22
Special-F 101.67 152.33 46.33 56 87.40
Enforcement-F 285 272 137 125.67 236.74
Bankruptcy-F 3.33 16.33 2 9.11
Guardianship-F 49 30.33 20.33 20.25
Other-F 1.33 51.67 8 2.33 23.46
Clearance rates
Common 0.85 0.98 0.89 1.12 1.05
Special 0.96 0.83 0.89 0.88 0.98
Enforcement 0.53 0.42 0.48 0.73 0.723
Bankruptcy 1.25 0.84 0.50 1.14
Guardianship 1.12 0.91 1.17 1.05
Other 0.67 0.83 2.40 0.88 1.01
Differences
Common -38 -8 -13.33 14.67 9.31
Special -4 -31.67 -6 -8 -4.59
Enforcement -251.67 -372.67 -146.67 -47 -103.46
Bankruptcy 0.67 -3 -2 -0.016
Guardianship 5.33 -2.83 3 0.12
Other -0.67 -10.67 4.67 -0.33 -4.06
22
Table 8: Characteristics of some units with large differences in ranking between ap-
proaches
Benches T24 and T68 are top performers under the ratio approach and bottom per-
formers under the separation and differences approaches. T24 and T68 are efficient under
the ratio approach because they excel in at least one of the clearance rates. Bench T68
shows one outstanding clearance rate (of 2.4 for other cases) and simultaneously a small
number of workers, which makes it comparatively better than its peers. bench T24 shows
a good performance performance in the clearance rate of bankruptcy and guardianship
cases, in spite of a clearly above average number of workers, making it also better than
its peers. Note however, that the ratio model does not take into account the fact that the
clearance rate of 2.4 for other cases of T68 does not represent a big amount of work as
only about 3 cases of this type entered the court during the period of analysis. This high
rate just meant the clearance of about 8 cases, which cannot be considered enough to
compensate for the low performance of this bench in dealing with other cases. Both the
separation approaches and the difference approach, working with volume measures, take
this fact into account and attribute to this unit an efficiency score that places it among
the bottom 25% units. Regarding bench T261 it is a top performer on the separation
approach and ratio approach, but a bottom 25% performer in the difference approach.
This is clearly a result of a very low number of workers of this court and a high level of
outputs (above average in all the approaches) - this makes units neglect the number of
cases entered when maximizing their efficiency score under the separation approach. As
a result this unit appears very efficient, but the fact is that it finishes a lower number of
cases than those that entered in the court for all types of cases, meaning that backlog is
building up in this court. The inefficiency of this court may in fact be attributed to an
insufficient number of workers for the cases received. This is not however technical ineffi-
ciency, but allocative inefficiency. This means that the difference approach and the ratio
approach by imposing strict links between inputs and outputs may indeed be capturing
more than just technical efficiency. Regarding bench T95 this is a top performer under
the difference approach, but a low performer under the ratio approach. This bench shows
a good performance in clearance rates, when compared for example with T261, but much
higher number of workers. Regarding the differences, indeed this is the bench in Table
8 showing a better balance in terms of the differences, in spite of the small values being
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indicative of the small size of the bench.
As a summary from the above we tend to favor the use of differences or the separation
approach as a way to link inputs and outputs that relate directly. The use of differences
is equivalent to the use of weight restrictions that impose equal weighting to the linked
inputs and outputs. It may however be a less general approach in the sense that the
computation of differences needs to yield a observable and meaningful measure (which
in our case was a measure of reduction in backlog). In case the differences cannot be
computed the separation approach appears as a very similar alternative, where rank
correlations with the difference approach are close to 80% and the absolute differences in
rankings is the lowest on average between these two approaches (it is 33 places difference
on average as compared to 93 places average difference between the difference and the
ratio approaches - the most dissimilar ones).
6 Conclusion & Discussion
This paper has addressed the topic of establishing links between specific inputs and
outputs in efficiency assessments. This is a topic that has deserved recent attention in
the literature, with some new developed models advocating the use of output specific
production functions and thus separate efficiency assessments. Through an illustrative
example on Portuguese courts’ efficiency we have compared separate assessments with two
other approaches that could be used in establishing the links between inputs and outputs:
One is the ratio approach, where output specific inputs are linked to outputs through a
ratio, and the other is the differences approach, where linkages are established through
differences. From this comparative study we conclude that the approach used to reflect
the linkages between inputs and outputs is not indifferent in terms of results produced.
The various approaches revealed some strengths and fragilities. Some of the fragilities
arose from modelling options, particularly in the ratio case, where the impossibility of
straightforwardly use ratio and volume measures in a standard DEA model generated a
non-convex model, which lead to less discriminating results, not necessarily comparable
with the remaining approaches. It is our view that the ratio model is not a particularly
good option for linking inputs and outputs in spite of it being probably the most intuitive
- particularly in the Court’s context where clearance rates are often used as a performance
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measures. The main reason for this is related to the low discrimination between units
that models suited to deal with this type of variables end up producing. In spite of
that the characteristics of top performers in the ratio approach and bottom performers
is not dramatically different from those resulting from the other two approaches. The
separation approach, by treating each output independently from the rest ends up in very
low efficiency scores and therefore demanding targets. However in terms of ranking and
in terms of worst and best performers the separation and the difference approaches are
in fact very similar, constituting two good alternatives for handling the type of linkages
between inputs and outputs addressed in this paper. The analysis of Portuguese courts
has been illustrative in this paper. In spite of that, there appears to be huge inefficiencies
in courts in Portugal, with large discrepancies between the number of cases received and
solved and the staff employed. Future work should pass through an in-depth analysis
of these inefficiencies (particularly after the reform in 2014) and an investigation of how
resources could be better re-allocated between courts. This could be a valuable input for
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